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1RISK-ADJUSTED PERFORMANCE MEASURES AT BANK 





This paper examines risk-adjusted performance measures in banking, which are used 
as a guide for efficient asset allocation, performance evaluation, and capital structure 
decisions in complex, multidivisional financial institutions. Traditional measures of 
performance are contrasted with the portfolio-based risk-adjusted measures using a 
unique detailed micro data set for a sample of domestic bank holding companies 
(BHCs) that engaged in both commercial banking and investment banking activities 
between 1990 and 1999. This paper finds evidence that traditional stand-alone 
performance measures can lead to results substantially different from those of the 
portfolio models.  This study also examines BHCs’ optimal portfolios consisting of 
traditional and nontraditional banking activities derived from the efficient frontiers.  
These results show that there are gains from diversification as indicated by the 
composition of optimal portfolios.   
 
 
Keywords:  Risk-adjusted return on capital (RAROC), Value at Risk (VaR), bank 
portfolio analysis 














2RISK-ADJUSTED PERFORMANCE MEASURES AT BANK 
HOLDING COMPANIES WITH SECTION 20 SUBSIDIARIES 
 
 
1.  Introduction 
One of bank management’s main objectives is to maximize risk-adjusted 
profitability subject to the regulatory constraint on bank total capital. One way to 
accomplish this objective is to minimize the risk of each activity in which a bank 
participates (for example, commercial banking, insurance, securities underwriting, 
mortgage banking, etc.) and then sum these risks over the entire organization. This 
approach, however, is problematic because it ignores the interdependent nature of 
risks within a company. During recent years, financial market practitioners and 
regulators have made great strides in the design, calibration, and implementation of 
portfolio models of credit risk.  Portfolio (or consolidated) models of risk allow bank 
management to identify concentrations of risk and opportunities for diversification on 
a company-wide basis. To measure the risk contribution of a unit to the entire 
organization, these models take into account the “stand-alone” volatility of a business 
line as well as the correlation between an individual business line and other units 
within the organization. Thus, adding a business line with lower correlation to an 
existing portfolio can bring diversification benefits, contributing little to the volatility 
(risk) of the portfolio.   
Serious work on the portfolio-based credit risk models has been fueled by the 
proposed new Capital Accord (Basel II), which is intended to ameliorate an 
increasingly urgent problem of regulatory arbitrage. Specifically, the current 
regulatory framework for required capital on commercial bank lending is based on 
the 1988 Basel Accord (Basel I), which fails to distinguish among loans of different 
degrees of credit risk. This creates an incentive for banks to move low-risk 
 
 
4instruments off balance sheet and retain only relatively high-risk instruments (Gordy, 
2002). Portfolio-based models provide a reliable way to determine the amount of 
capital necessary to support various business lines and the overall leverage for the 
bank and closely link capital charges to the organization’s credit risk exposures, 
resulting in a more efficient allocation of capital (Cumming and Hirtle, 2001).   
Despite the high level of interest in internal risk-adjusted capital allocation 
models, so far only the largest banks are known to have successfully implemented 
them.
1 There are computational and information systems barriers to implementing 
these models.  One of the biggest challenges arises from the need to assess measures 
of performance that are comparable across business units, especially when 
organizations are involved in a wide range of financial activities.  This is particularly 
relevant in light of the recent passage of the Financial Services Modernization Act of 
1999, which allowed BHCs to engage in a greater scope of activities, such as 
insurance, investment banking, and merchant banking. This presents challenges to 
consolidated risk, since diversity often means that models must consider a variety of 
risk types to construct meaningful measures of performance. Risk-adjusted 
performance measures (RAPM), discussed in greater detail below, use the concept of 
Value at Risk to derive the risk-adjusted return on capital, which is used as a guide 
for active portfolio management and performance evaluation. 
The goal of this paper is to examine risk-adjusted performance measures in 
banking, which are used as a guide for efficient asset allocation, performance 
evaluation, and capital structure decisions in complex, multidivisional financial 
                                                           
1 See Treacy and Carey (1998) for the analysis of internal credit risk modeling at the 50 
largest consolidated domestic BHCs.  The scarcity of the data required to estimate credit risk 
models stems from the infrequent nature of default events, nonmarketability of some bank 
products and services, and longer-term time horizons used in measuring credit risk.  Larger 
 
 
5institutions. In this paper, traditional measures of performance are contrasted with the 
portfolio-based risk-adjusted measures of performance for the sample of domestic 
bank holding companies (BHCs) that engaged in both commercial banking and 
investment banking activities from 1990 through 1999. Unlike previous studies that 
relied on the hypothetical-merger analysis to examine potential benefits of 
diversification arising from bank expansion into investment banking activities (Wall 
and Eisenbeis, 1984; Boyd and Graham, 1986; Boyd and Graham, 1988; Boyd, 
Hanweck, and Hewitt, 1993; Allen and Jagtiani, 1996; Saunders and Walter, 1996), 
this study uses a fundamentally different approach based on a unique detailed micro 
data set for BHCs with securities affiliates (also known as Section 20 affiliates) 
operating in the U.S. from 1990 through 1999.
2  This approach allows me to capture 
potentially important synergies within established, integrated production processes 
that studies of unrelated firms cannot capture. To my knowledge, only two studies 
used such data: an unpublished study by Boyd and Pithyachariyakul (1981) and 
Kwan (1998).  However, these studies conducted separate analyses of risk and return 
without deriving risk-adjusted performance measures (RAPM). Landskroner, 
Ruthenberg, and Zaken (2005) estimate RAPM using actual banking financial 
statements, but the study is conducted using a small number of “universal” banks in 
Israel.  No similar studies were conducted for the U.S. market. 
The present paper describes and estimates alternative forms of RAPM and 
discusses the appropriateness of each measure in the context of assessing the 
                                                                                                                                                       
banks are usually better positioned to use internal risk models because they have longer-term 
data and the statistical sophistication to implement these models. 
2 Section 20 subsidiaries are subsidiaries of bank holding companies that were authorized by 
the Federal Reserve to conduct bank-ineligible securities activities. Historically, Section 20 of 
the Glass-Steagall Act of 1933 expressly prohibited banks from any affiliations with 
organizations engaged in the underwriting, sale, or distribution of stocks, bonds, debentures, 
notes, or other securities.  
 
 
6consistency of BHCs’ portfolio performance. One of the main findings of this paper 
illustrates that traditional “stand-alone” performance measures can lead to results 
substantially different from those of the portfolio models. When the true correlation 
between a prospective investment and an existing portfolio is nonzero, the traditional 
performance measures may lead to incorrect management assessment of prospective 
or past investment decisions. This study also examines BHCs’ optimal portfolios, 
consisting of commercial banking and investment banking components derived from 
the efficient frontiers. Similar to Landskroner et al. (2005), I find evidence of gains 
from diversification as indicated by the composition of optimal portfolios. The 
evidence presented in this paper has important implications for bank regulators.   
Reliable measures of performance and diversification gains help regulators to 
evaluate the appropriateness of allowing banks to engage in nontraditional bank 
activities.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the 
types of risk-adjusted performance measures used in portfolio models of credit risk 
and discusses the relationship between them. Section 3 describes the sample of BHCs 
involved in securities underwriting activities between 1990 and 1999. Section 4 
follows with an empirical implementation of RAPM for the sample of domestic 
BHCs and discusses main findings. Section 5 compares predictions of the risk-
adjusted models with optimal allocations based on the efficient-frontier methodology 




72.  Risk-Adjusted Performance Measures 
Risk-adjusted performance measures, or RAPM, have been one of the 
catchphrases of the banking industry over the last decade or so. The term embraces a 
number of concepts and has been given different definitions, but all RAPM 
techniques have one thing in common: they compare risk-adjusted return against an 
appropriate hurdle rate that reflects the bank’s cost of capital or the opportunity cost 
to stockholders in holding equity in the bank.
3 Risk-adjusted return on capital 
(RAROC) is usually derived by dividing excess return by the total amount of 
economic capital, where economic capital is measured on the basis of the potential 
loss of value over a given period of time at a certain confidence level, or the Value at 
Risk (VaR).   
Excess return is measured relative to the required rate of return, or the hurdle 
rate. Some models define the hurdle rate as ROE, while others define it as the risk-
free rate or as some measure of the weighted-average cost of capital (Saunders and 
Allen, 2002). By incorporating the opportunity cost into the managers’ decision-
making and using economic rather than accounting profits, banks hope to align 
managerial behavior more closely with shareholders’ interests. In terms of 
performance, we hypothesize that when banks allocate scarce resources, business 
units earning a return in excess of a risk-adjusted opportunity cost of equity are 
candidates to receive additional resources, while those earning less than the 
opportunity cost of equity are candidates for corrective action (Kimball, 1998).  In 
                                                           
3 Landskroner et al. (2005) describes the four most commonly cited RAPM models: RORAA 
(return on risk-adjusted assets), RAROA (risk-adjusted return on assets), RORAC (return on 
risk-adjusted capital), and RAROC (risk-adjusted return on capital).  The differences between 
the last two measures are often blurred; both are aggregated under the acronym RAROC, 
which I use in this study. 
 
 
8other words, those business units that earn higher risk-adjusted return should be 
allocated higher investment. 
 
2.1.  Risk-Adjusted Performance Measures in Banking  
 
There are several approaches to measure risk-adjusted performance: the 
stand-alone and the portfolio approaches. These measures are commonly used in the 
literature on equity investment, and they are the Sharpe, Treynor, and Jensen 
performance measures (Bodie, Kane, and Marcus, 2005).   
Under the stand-alone methodology, the risk of each activity in which a bank 
participates is expressed in terms of the volatility of its returns (i.e., the standard 
deviation) without accounting for correlation between banks’ activities. The 
theoretical risk-adjusted return is derived from the one-factor capital asset pricing 
model (CAPM), which assumes that all assets are tradable and the opportunity cost of 
holding capital in the bank is the return on the market portfolio (James, 1996; 
Crouhy, Turnbull, and Wakeman, 1998).
4 Following Matten (2000), Landskroner, 
Ruthenberg, and Zaken (2005), and Bodie, Kane, and Marcus (2005), the stand-alone 
risk-adjusted return on each activity i is based on total economic capital or Value at 
Risk (VaR),  i σ .  This measure is the simple Sharpe ratio or the reward to variability 
ratio (RVAR), which can be expressed as: 
                                                           
4 From the one-factor CAPM, the theoretical RAROC is equal to the excess return on the 








where Rm, Ri, and Rf are the market return, return on a risky asset i, and the risk-free rate of 
return, respectively;  m σ = the standard deviation of the market return;  im σ = covariance 























where NIi and  i σ  are the average earnings and the standard deviation of earnings 
from the activity i, respectively;
5 Eit is the average equity investment in activity i, 
measured as the total equity capital from the call reports, consolidated BHC reports, 
and Section 20 subsidiaries’ reports; Rf is the risk-free rate of return on U.S. Treasury 
bills; NIfi is average earnings in the risk-free activity derived from activity i, defined 
as Rf*Eit, and can be thought of as an opportunity cost of capital invested in i. 
CAPM assumes that all tradable risks (risks that can be hedged at little cost 
in the capital market) are diversified away. Applied to banks, this would mean that a 
bank can frictionlessly hedge all risk in the capital market and thus should have no 
reason for risk management. However, this may not be the case because bank 
divisions do not usually have market-determined valuations. The RAROC 
methodology was first developed in the late 1970s by a group at Bankers Trust to 
deal with individual bank products or divisions, some of which may be nontradable.
6   
                                                                                                                                                       
i returns on i and the market portfolio; β  is the market risk of the risky asset i (Saunders and 
Allen, 2002).  
5 It is common in the banking literature to use earnings instead of rates of return to evaluate 
RAROC (Landskroner, et al., 2005). Income comprises net interest income (the difference 
between interest income and interest expense), noninterest income, realized gains (losses) on 
held-to-maturity and available-for-sale securities, minus provision for loan and lease losses, 
and minus noninterest expense.   
6 See James (1996) for the discussion of this model. Froot and Stein (1998) developed a 
framework for capital budgeting that is based on the objective of profit maximization but also 
incorporates risk management and the fact that some risks cannot be hedged away.  They 
derived a two-factor CAPM, in which they decomposed total risk into a tradable (market) risk 




10Another problem with using the stand-alone measurements is that they do not 
take into consideration the effects of diversification that arise in situations when the 
returns on the individual business activities are less than perfectly correlated. Such 
activities will tend to dampen the fluctuations in returns for the bank as a whole, so 
that the total risk of the bank will be less than the sum of the risks of the individual 
stand-alone business components. In effect, the business units will tend to act as 
partial natural hedges for each other, reducing the need for equity capital (Kimball, 
1998). The theoretical RAROC measure that incorporates the effect of diversification 
is referred to as the reward to volatility (RVOL) or the Treynor ratio. It is measured 
by the excess return evaluated against the portfolio’s internal systematic risk. Unlike 
the Sharpe ratio, the Treynor ratio is a portfolio-type measure and considers the 
correlation between various BHCs’ activities. Activity’s contribution to the overall 
portfolio performance is evaluated against its systematic risk rather than against total 


























where IVaR is the incremental Value at Risk, defined as the marginal effect on VaR 
of adding a new instrument or business unit to an existing portfolio.
7   
                                                           
7 VaR= p ασ , where α is a factor defined by the probability with which the actual loss may 
not exceed the VaR and  p σ is the standard deviation of earnings on the institution’s portfolio 











 for business units i≠j, which represents a change in VaR of the bank’s 
overall portfolio due to an additional instrument i.      
 
 
11IVaRi =  ip β VaRp,, where the coefficient  ip β is the systematic risk of asset i in the 
portfolio p. Given that some assets of BHCs or business units are nontradable, the 
relative risk contribution of each line of business is calculated as an internal beta, 
defined as the ratio of the covariance between the business unit’s and bank’s 
(portfolio) returns to the variance of the bank’s returns.
8 Those business lines with 
relatively low correlation in returns are allocated less equity capital than the business 
lines with relatively high correlation in returns. 
Another portfolio-type risk measure is an application of the Jensen’s alpha 
( i α ) or economic value added, EVA. This measure indicates if the earnings of 
activity i are above the “benchmark” BHC (rather than the market) portfolio, based 
on an “internal” CAPM.
9  Applied to BHCs’ activities, EVA – also referred to in the 
finance literature as Jensen’s alpha – can be expressed in the following equation:  
Equation 3 








α = , where Ei is the average equity investment in the activity i, 
defined above; NIp are the average earnings of the “benchmark” BHC portfolio 
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)
8 This constitutes an important difference between the performance measures in finance and 
their applications in the banking literature. 
9 Expressed in terms of rates of returns,  ,where Ri is the ROE on 
the activity i; Rf is the risk-free rate of return; and 








= ;  Rp is the return on equity for a 
BHC (“benchmark”) portfolio or a hurdle rate of return for RAROCi. 
 
 
12In its applications in banking, EVA is a performance measure of the amount 
by which adjusted earnings exceed or fall short of the opportunity cost of the capital 
involved. The decision rule is the following: if  i α  is positive and significantly 
different from zero, then an activity should be undertaken because it has a superior 
risk-adjusted performance compared to that of the BHC’s portfolio. EVA is an 
increasingly popular performance metric. Researchers have argued that among many 
measures of performance, including ROA, ROE, and EPS, EVA is the most relevant 
measure of the success of the management team’s effort (Uyemura, Kantor, and 
Pettit, 1996). Proponents of this measure contend that by incorporating the 
opportunity cost of equity capital into performance measurement and incentive 
systems, an EVA-based system makes explicit each bank manager’s increased focus 
and commitment.   
Both the reward to variability (the Sharpe measure) and the reward to 
volatility (the Treynor measure) are modifications of RAROC and provide a 
comparable index by which several portfolios can be assessed and ranked. The higher 
the risk-adjusted return, the better is the portfolio’s performance and the more likely 
is its inclusion in an investment portfolio.  Table 1 illustrates the relationship between 
these performance measures, and they are empirically estimated below.
10      
                                                           
10 It is important to note that for a well-diversified portfolio, the Sharpe, the Treynor, and the 
Jensen performance measures yield the same rankings (Table 1). To prove equality of 
rankings for well-diversified portfolios, assume that there exist two well-diversified 







= ).  Also assume that Rm>Rf.  It is simple to show that the 
portfolio ranking according to the Sharpe ratio (SR) and the Treynor ratio (TR) will be the 
same (SRi can be expressed as the ratio of TRi to  m σ ; thus, if SRi>SRj then TRi >TRj).   Next, 
consider the rankings according to the Treynor and the Jensen measures.  If, for example, 
RirRj and  ij β β ≤  with at least one strict inequality, we can show that TRi>TRj.  Because 
() () ( ij ij ij mf ) R RR R α αβ β −=− −− − , at least one term on the right-hand side will be 
 
 
133.  Sample Selection  
 
This study estimates risk-adjusted performance measures for the sample of 
BHCs that were authorized by the Federal Reserve to conduct bank-ineligible 
securities activities (Section 20 activities) from 1990 through 1999.  Accounting data 
for BHCs’ subsidiaries consist of annualized financial statements for domestic BHC 
subsidiaries engaged in ineligible securities underwriting and dealing (FR Y-20 
reports
11) and annualized FDIC Call and Income Reports for commercial bank 
subsidiaries controlled by the same holding companies.
12  The sample period is from 
1990 – the first year FR Y-20 data were collected – through the end of 1999, when 
passage of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act allowed a qualified BHC to convert into a 
financial holding company and not file the FR Y-20 reports. As a result, the 
companies that remained after 1999 were no longer representative of companies 
involved in securities activities.   
Balance-sheet data were averaged over the quarters in which Section 20 
subsidiaries reported, to derive an annual figure for Section 20 firms and their 
                                                                                                                                                       
i positive.  Thus, α > j α  and we conclude that for well-diversified portfolios, the Sharpe, the 
Treynor, and the Jensen performance measures yield the same rankings.  
11 Financial Statements for a Bank Holding Company Subsidiary Engaged in Bank-Ineligible 
Securities Underwriting and Dealing are filed with the Federal Reserve.  This report is filed 
by all bank holding companies for each subsidiary that engages in bank-ineligible securities 
underwriting and dealing, and it is not available to the public.  Confidentiality of individual 
reports is preserved by data aggregation.   
12 Activities of lead banks are used as a proxy for BHCs’ commercial bank subsidiaries. Lead 
commercial banks are defined as the largest bank in a multibank holding company. One 
caveat about representing commercial banking activity by lead bank is that there might be 
other, albeit smaller, commercial banks under the same BHC structure that are omitted from 
the calculations. One possible solution is to aggregate across all commercial banks that are 
controlled by the same holding company. This, however, presents a problem, since the 
majority of BHCs involved in securities activities are very complex financial organizations 
with 50 or more subsidiaries. This would be of particular concern if the share of lead banks’ 
assets to the total BHC assets were low. However, in this sample, the total assets of lead 
banks comprise a large portion of the consolidated assets of BHCs. The mean (median) ratio 
of lead banks’ assets to total BHC assets is 67 percent (73 percent). Thus, limiting the analysis 
to lead banks should not significantly distort the results for commercial banking activities.  I 
 
 
14consolidated top-tier parent companies. For example, if for any reason (such as later 
establishment date or an earlier exit) a Section 20 affiliate did not report for a full 
year, the averages for Section 20 as well as for their consolidated bank holding 
companies were adjusted to reflect this. Income information was matched to Section 
20 data by the date reported on the Y-20. For each BHC, the Y-9C reports have a 
unique code that identifies a BHC over time and allows firm-level calculations. In 
cases of mergers and acquisitions, the acquiring BHC’s code was maintained and the 
target was dropped from the sample.  
 
4.  The Main Findings 
 
  Tables 2 through 4 calculate various risk-adjusted measures described above 
to compare the performance of the consolidated BHCs and their business components 
during the period between 1990 and 1999. The main interest of the analysis of 
performance is the rankings of BHC portfolios, how a specific activity performed 
relative to a BHC portfolio, as well as how a specific activity performed relative to 
other activities in which a BHC is involved.   
It should be noted that the Treynor (RVOL) measure and the EVA measure 
are reported only on an activity basis because these measures are based on internal 
systematic risk, which cannot be compared across companies. Inter-company 
comparisons and rankings of the individual activities should be performed using total 
risk measures, such as the Sharpe ratio (Landskroner et al., 2005). The Sharpe 
measure (RVAR) and the Treynor measure (RVOL) for entire BHCs are identical 
because of the property that the sum of individual divisions’ incremental Value at 
                                                                                                                                                       
also find that excluding observations with a small share (less than 50 percent) of lead banks’ 
 
 
15Risk, IVaR, equals the overall BHC’s Value at Risk, or  p σ . Jensen’s alpha, which 
uses an internal risk approach to measure earnings above the benchmark portfolio, is 
by definition equal to zero in the case of the entire BHC portfolio and, therefore, not 
reported in the table.  
       First, we compare the performance of BHCs, or total investment, during the 
sample period 1990-1999. The risk-adjusted RVAR rankings are different from the 
traditional ROE rankings (column 1 and column 2).
13 The performance of the overall 
BHC is affected by the performance of its components and how heavily the company 
is involved in these various activities. For example, a company that ranked first 
according to the traditional ROE measure invested more than 90 percent of its assets 
in commercial banking (compared to the average of 62 percent for the whole 
sample). This company’s auspicious performance can be attributed to its relatively 
good performance in both banking and Section 20 activities. On the other hand, the 
company that ranked last according to the RVAR measure performed poorly 
compared to the average for all BHCs in both the commercial banking and securities 
underwriting activities. Five securities subsidiaries had negative RVAR measures, 
suggesting that these activities generated an average rate of return below the risk-free 
rate. A closer examination reveals that these companies were newer entrants in the 
securities underwriting business, which may explain their lackluster performance.   
Because the majority of companies invested heavily in traditional banking, 
the RVAR rankings of BHCs and commercial banking – columns 5 and 3, 
respectively, in Table 2 – yield similar results. The Spearman rank correlation 
                                                                                                                                                       
assets to the total BHC assets had little impact on the results of the analysis. 
 
 
16between these RVAR measures is 0.88. In contrast, the rank correlation between 
RVAR of BHCs (column 5) and RVAR of Section 20 activities (in column 4) is only 
0.1, suggesting only a weak relationship between these measures. This occurs 
because the correlation between the earnings of the securities activities and BHCs is 
low. Hence, it is important not to ignore the effects of diversification and to take 
them into consideration in the risk-adjusted performance calculations.    
As mentioned in the above discussion, the Treynor and the EVA 
performance measures are based on the systematic risk, which depends on the 
internal correlations. Thus, it is useful to examine the intrabank correlations among 
activities that determine the internal systematic risk. Specifically, the correlation 
between earnings of commercial banking units and earnings of the consolidated 
BHCs is high, approximately 0.7 for the group as a whole. In contrast, the correlation 
between securities activities and commercial banking is negative but not statistically 
different from zero. The relatively low correlation coefficient between securities and 
commercial banking activities serves as evidence of diversification opportunities 
across the BHC’s activities.   
Table 3 and Table 4 compare the performance of the component activities of 
BHCs, taking into consideration systematic risk, where systematic risk is evaluated in 
reference to each portfolio. According to the system averages, performance of 
securities subsidiaries was superior to that of commercial banking subsidiaries, 
measured by both the Treynor (RVOL) and the Jensen (EVA) metrics.
14 These 
findings contradict results based on the Sharpe ratios that suggested that performance 
                                                                                                                                                       
13 The distribution-free Spearman rank correlation coefficient between nontraditional (column 
1 in Table 2) and traditional (column 2) rankings for BHCs is 0.5.  The correlation coefficient 
of zero is rejected at the 0.05 level, but not at the 0.01 level.  
 
 
17of commercial banking activities was superior to that of securities underwriting.  This 
example shows a problem with using the traditional stand-alone measures in 
management decision-making because they ignore correlations between a prospective 
asset acquisition (an activity expansion) and an existing portfolio. The higher the 
correlation, the more activities expansion would add to overall portfolio risk and the 
higher the expected (required) return needed to make the expansion attractive. Note 
that the required return for expansions that reduce risk (activities that are less than 
perfectly correlated) is less than the existing expected portfolio returns. In the case 
where the correlation between activities is low or negative, the traditional 
performance measures overestimate the required return and may lead to incorrect 
decisions not to expand into new activities. Recognizing the omission of traditional 
ratios, EVA is increasingly becoming a key measure of bank performance.    
 
5.  Implications of the RAROC Performance Measures 
 
 
5.1.  Implications for Investment Allocation 
 
This section compares predictions of the RAROC-based models with 
predictions of the optimal structure of BHC investments based on the efficient-
frontier methodology.  The optimal allocation of BHCs’ activities is determined by 
deriving efficient frontiers and solving for optimal portfolios for each BHC 
separately and for the group as a whole.  I compare optimal asset allocations with the 
actual asset allocations in commercial banking, investment banking (Section 20 
activities), and other activities (defined below).  The optimization problem can be 
written as: 
                                                                                                                                                       





2 w'Ω w BHC w
Minσ =  
subject  to 
Equation 2  




        
Equation 3 
0 ≥ w            
where  μ is a vector of returns;   is a covariance matrix; and w is a vector of 
portfolio weights allocated to banking, securities, and other activities. When one of 
the assets is risk-free, the constraint becomes 
Ω
f w'μ+(1-w'1)R BHC μ = . The 
optimization is performed using the average risk-free return, Rf, over the 1990-1999 
period, to maximize the Sharpe ratio.
15  Given the expected returns, variances, and 
covariances of assets in the portfolio, the efficient frontier can be derived by 
changing the target expected return on the portfolio. The objective is to maximize the 
slope of the tangent (capital allocation) line from the risk-free return to the efficient 
frontier.
16   
Before we proceed, it is important to define “other” activities.  In the context 
of this study, “other” is defined as the residual of BHC total assets and the sum of 
                                                                                                                                                       
zero, suggesting that neither of these activities significantly outperformed the BHC portfolio. 
15 Monthly averages for the three-month Treasury bills are computed on an issue-date basis.  
The rates are annualized, using a 360-day year or bank interest (source: Haver).  The average 
for this period was 4.8 percent.    
16 I used Mathematica to find optimal portfolio allocations that satisfy the Kuhn-Tucker 
necessary conditions for the optimization problem in Equations 8-10 (for methodology, see 
Huang and Crooke, 1997).   
 
 
19commercial banking and Section 20 activities.
17 The category “other” may include 
insurance; data processing and information services; asset and capital management; 
business, sales, and consumer finance activities; mortgage banking, and so forth.          
    The optimization was performed in two parts: for long-term and short-term 
horizons. In the long-term problem, I assume that the bank is permitted unlimited 
changes in its portfolio mix. For the short-term optimization problem, the 
possibilities for portfolio changes are limited. I specify 20 percent as the maximum 
permissible change in investment relative to the existing positions because it 
approximately equals the calculated actual change in commercial banking activity 
between 1990 and 1999. In both cases, optimization is performed subject to the no-
short-sales constraint (the weight of each activity in the overall portfolio, wi, is 
greater than or equal to zero).
18
The results of calculations of optimal and actual portfolio allocations for the 
short-term and long-term horizons are presented in Table 5 and Table 6, respectively.  
Table 5 also reports actual changes in the portfolio composition between the two sub-
periods: 1990 through 1994 and 1995 through 1999. The analysis is limited to BHCs 
that reported continuously during the entire period to ensure that there are enough 
time-series observations to perform long-term optimization even though it can 
potentially introduce survivorship bias. I also exclude BHCs with the proportion of 
“other” activities greater than 50 percent of consolidated BHCs’ assets to focus the 
analysis on BHCs with significant investment in traditional banking activities. The 
                                                           
17 Recall that commercial banking was proxied by activities of the lead banks–the largest or 
dominant banks in a multibank holding company.  The category “other” includes all activities, 
besides those of the lead bank and Section 20 affiliates, conducted by the consolidated BHCs 
(refer to the discussion in note 12).  
18 The original problem was also subject to the constraint that limited securities activities to 
20 percent of the total BHC assets.  However, this constraint did not bind, since the actual 
investment in Section 20 activities was, on average, about 4 percent. 
 
 
20final data set is a balanced panel of 12 BHCs that participated in all three types of 
activities between 1990 and 1999 and that had more than half of their assets invested 
in traditional banking activities.   
First,  Table 5 shows that in the short run, with limited possibilities for 
changes in the portfolio mix, in order to maximize the ratio of excess return to the 
volatility of return, BHCs in this sample should slightly reduce their commercial 
banking activities, by 2.3 percentage points, and basically leave the securities 
activities at the current level. In the long run, however, as depicted by Table 6, BHCs 
should reduce their commercial banking activities from the average of 74 percent of 
the total BHCs’ assets to approximately 61 percent. At the same time, they should 
increase their investment in securities activities from 4.4 percent of total assets to 
22.4 percent (the long-run figures are reported in parenthesis). Despite the fact that 
commercial banking was a major and, in general, profitable activity during the 1990s, 
the recommendation for a long-term horizon may be indicative of overinvestment in 
this business area. Similar results were reported by Landskroner, Ruthenberg, and 
Zaken (2005) for the sample of Israeli banks. 
The discrepancy between short-term and long-term optimal allocations may 
exist because of the possible slow and costly adjustment in the banks’ portfolio 
allocation. Researchers have documented costs that banks incur from excessive 
shrinking or expansion of their portfolios, particularly in loan markets. Sharpe (1990) 
uses an information asymmetry explanation to show that severing long-term 
customer relationships in lending markets is costly for banks.
19  On the other hand, 
                                                           
19 According to that theory, a bank may incur initial losses as it lends to new firms.  But in the 
process of lending, a bank becomes privy to information not available to others, which allows 
it to capture rents generated by older customers. 
 
 
21an excessive growth of a (loan) portfolio may also be costly, since banks may be 
forced to lower their credit standards to accept more borrowers.  
Second, as evident from the table, there are gains from diversification as 
manifested in the nonzero optimal allocation in all feasible activities. In the long run, 
an average BHC in the sample should allocate 61 percent of its investments to 
commercial banking activities, 22 percent to securities activities, and 17 percent to 
the remaining nonbank activities. In the short run in Table 5, such large fluctuations 
are difficult to achieve; therefore, the corresponding allocations are 71 percent, 4 
percent, and 25 percent, respectively. Third, with only a few exceptions, the optimal 
direction of change for the long-term allocations to securities activities is consistent 
with that based on RAROC measures. Recall from Table 4 that the EVA performance 
measure, which adjusts for the correlation between activities, suggests that the 
performance of Section 20 subsidiaries was superior to that of traditional commercial 
banking activities. Thus, companies should channel their investments toward better-
performing business divisions. 
Fourth, in the majority of cases, the actual change in BHCs’ portfolios 
between the first and second halves of the 1990s was consistent with the changes 
needed to optimize the Sharpe ratio. Banks took advantage of diversification by 
investing in all activities. In terms of the actual changes in allocations, BHCs 
increased their portfolio allocation to commercial banking and securities activities 
during the 1990s. All but one company followed the long-run optimization path for 
securities activities. Four BHCs followed the optimization path and reduced 
allocation to commercial banking between 1990 and 1999. Of those, three BHCs 
experienced a significant increase in return on equity between the two sub-periods.  
In contrast, a company that ranked fifth among all BHCs followed the optimization 
 
 
22path for the commercial banking activity, but not for the securities activities. That 
company was the only BHC to experience a decline in performance between the two 
sub-periods.   
In sum, both the short-term and long-term optimization results indicate that 
BHCs in this sample should reduce their investment in commercial banking, and they 
should increase their investment in securities underwriting in the long term. The 
discrepancy in the magnitude of change between short-term and long-term horizons 
probably arises owing to the costly adjustment in the banks’ portfolio composition. 
 
5.2.  Implications for Capital Allocation 
 
As discussed in the introduction, many banks use risk-adjusted performance 
measures (RAPM) to actively manage their portfolios of investments or activities and 
for performance evaluation. An active approach to capital allocation uses RAPM 
processes to influence business results by adjusting the capital allocated to particular 
business units and encourages managers to maximize returns on this allocated capital.  
After determining the amount of capital available, the active approach involves 
setting the targets for expected returns. Once the targets are set, management 
allocates capital to business units, based on their “contribution” to the overall 
volatility of the bank’s earnings, so that the effect of individual investment decisions 
on the overall level of risk is internalized. Because in this model the capital allocation 
depends both on the standard deviation of earnings of each division and on the 
covariance with the other divisions, the decisions of one division or business unit 
affect the decisions of other units. In this way, the price of risk internalizes the 
externality across business divisions (James, 1996; Stoughton and Zechner, 1999).   
 
 
23The internal models approach is designed to fully capture portfolio 
diversification effects that occur when assets that are less than perfectly correlated 
are combined in a portfolio. The goal is to more closely align the regulatory 
assessment of risk capital with the risks actually faced by the bank. General market 
risk is a direct function of the output from the internal Value at Risk model. Under 
the normality assumption, VaR (or earnings at risk, EAR) is set to equal economic 
capital, defined as * α σ , whereσ is the standard deviation of earnings andα is a 
factor defined by the probability with which the actual loss may not exceed VaR.  
α is determined by management’s appetite for risk and is set to equal three in this 
study (the specific risk charge is explained in more detail in the Basel Amendment, 
1996).
20   
Table 7 presents average values of actual, regulatory, and economic capital – 
defined as VaR above – for the sample of BHCs that participated in all three types of 
activities. The table shows that between 1990 and 1999, allocated regulatory capital 
of BHCs was above economic capital, suggesting that regulatory capital was not a 
good guide for efficient allocation of capital for these financial institutions.   
Economic capital of individual business divisions was below actual allocations. This 
indicates that if bank management conducted internal risk calculations, their 
assessment of capital would be lower than what was actually allocated. This is a 
                                                           
20 When earnings are normally distributed, one standard deviation implies a confidence 
interval of around two-thirds: that is to say that annual earnings will be no more than one 
standard deviation either side of the average earnings two-thirds of the time. Because this 
level of confidence is probably too low, managers tend to use a higher level of two (95 
percent confidence interval) or even three standard deviations (99 percent confidence interval) 
around the mean to calculate EAR. Management’s choice of the confidence interval is usually 
determined by evaluating implicit risks and default rates of an asset over a certain period of 
time, usually one year. 
An alternative definition of economic capital is the ratio of earnings at risk to the required 
return.  One difficulty in calculating economic capital is the choice of the required return.  
Available options include the risk-free rate, the cost of capital, or a target rate of return. 
 
 
24particularly important finding in light of the impending new bank capital regulations 
under Basel II that will require banks to make their own assessment of the various 
risks they face and decide on the appropriate allocations of capital to cushion those 
risks. The Basel Committee on Bank Supervision undertook several detailed impact 
studies of how banks’ internal portfolio-based models will change the capital levels 
required to cover credit and operational risks (Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision, 2003). The committee’s findings indicate that banks using the internal 
ratings-based approach will be likely to register an overall decrease in their minimum 
capital requirements.
21 It appears that BHCs in this sample are also likely to 
experience downward calibration of the capital levels when they move toward new 
capital requirements.   
The evidence on excess capital is consistent with the literature that reports 
that banks may hold excess capital for reasons not necessarily related to internal risk 
(see, for example, Matten, 2000; Furfine, 2001).
22  What are the reasons for banks to 
hold excess (buffer) capital? One reason is to avoid costs related to market discipline 
and regulatory intervention if their capital is approaching or falling below the 
minimum capital ratio. A poorly capitalized bank runs the risk of losing market 
confidence and reputation. Thus, excess capital acts as an insurance against costs that 
                                                           
21 These are group results.  There is a significant variation in outcomes across banks (Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision, 2003). 
22 In his remarks about the new Basel Accord in November 2003, Federal Reserve Vice 
Chairman Roger Ferguson mentioned that “the overwhelming majority of U.S. banks 
maintain capital above the well-capitalized criteria of 10 percent of risk-weighted assets under 
the U.S. prompt corrective action rules, and generally the smaller the bank, the larger the 
proportionate capital cushion. Nearly 95 percent of all small and medium-sized banks have 
regulatory capital ratios of at least 10 percent, and thus it is likely that their current ratios 
would essentially meet or surpass proposed requirements under Basel II.” (“The Changing 
Regulatory Capital Regime in Europe: A Challenging New Business Concept,” Brussels, 
Belgium, November 2003) 
 
 
25a bank may incur because of unexpected loan losses and difficulties in raising new 
capital.   
Other reasons to hold excess capital include portfolio risk (the riskier the 
portfolio, the higher the capital buffer); market discipline (the bank’s capital buffer 
should depend positively on the capital buffer of its rivals); regulatory discipline 
(increased regulatory scrutiny should increase the buffer capital (Lindquist, 2003)); 
the potential business opportunities (Berger, et al., 1995, refer to it as the “franchise 
value”); and economic cycle (the capital buffer is generally thought to be pro-
cyclical).
23   
Leading financial firms maintain levels of eligible regulatory capital far in 
excess of the regulatory minimums (Herring and Schuermann, 2003), in part, because 
of regulatory inducements. In the United States, for example, banks must have a Tier 
1 risk-based capital ratio of 6 percent or more (rather than the minimum of 4 percent) 
and a Tier 1 to total asset (leverage) capital ratio of 5 percent or more (rather than the 
4 percent minimum) to be considered “well capitalized” (US GAO, 1998). Well-
capitalized banks have lower risk-based deposit insurance premiums and are more 
likely to receive regulatory permission to expand activities. Herring and Schuermann 
(2003) assert that for leading firms, market forces, not minimum regulatory capital 
requirements, appear to play an important role in firms’ capital decisions. These 
authors point out that these firms target ratings for their long-term debt that exceed 
the degree of protection from insolvency that the regulators require.        
For the sample of BHCs that participated in both banking and Section 20 
activities between 1990 and 1999, Table 7 demonstrates that the risk-adjusted capital 
ratio was 12 percent, whereas the bank is considered adequately capitalized with the 
 
 
26standard risk-based ratio of 8 percent (and well capitalized with the ratio of 10 
percent). This is in line with the evidence presented above that the majority of banks 
in this country hold regulatory capital above the required levels. What is the cost of 
this misallocation? The level of capital that the bank’s management decides is 
appropriate should be supported by an internal assessment of the capital at risk.   
Excessive amounts of equity can reduce the value of the bank and increase its 
weighted average cost of financing as explained below. In competitive markets in the 
long run, higher costs are likely to be passed on to bank customers in the form of the 
reduced size of the banking industry and the quantity of financial intermediation.  
Santomero and Watson (1977) stress that the opportunity costs generated when banks 
hold excessive amounts of capital are borne by the banking community and the 
society at large. First, the funds used by banks become more expensive on the 
margin, translating into a higher weighted average cost of capital. Second, 
misallocation of capital may divert funds from more productive loans and decrease 
the existing stock of physical capital in the economy. Third, the larger the capital 
allocation, the more difficult it is for a line of business to earn an economic profit.  
Theoretically, it would be possible for each line of business to fail to earn its required 
opportunity cost of stand-alone equity, while the bank as a whole surpassed its 
required opportunity cost of equity based on actual equity capital, which includes the 
effects of diversification (Kimball, 1998). In extreme cases, a bank might choose to 
exit a business based on an insufficient return to equity earned on allocated capital, 
when the return on equity on actual capital might be quite satisfactory. 
Once risk calculations for individual business units are compiled, the risk-
adjusted return is derived by dividing adjusted income by the total amount of 
                                                                                                                                                       
23 The latter was a topic of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision Conference in 2001: 
 
 
27economic capital. According to Table 7, the level of earnings at risk (EAR) at 
commercial banking units is higher than at securities affiliates, and therefore, in an 
active approach to capital allocation, bank management should allocate higher levels 
of capital to those units to account for higher risk. In terms of performance, RAROC 
of securities affiliates is greater than RAROC of commercial banking. This is in 
accord with the EVA rankings presented in the previous section. The table also 
shows that RAROC of consolidated BHCs is superior to that of both the Section 20 
subsidiaries and commercial banking alone. This serves as evidence of benefits from 
bank diversification into securities activities.   
A large number of U.S. banks have invested heavily in models designed to 
measure the risks associated with their different lines of business. The immediate 
purpose of such risk-measurement models is to provide bank managements with a 
more reliable way to determine the amount of capital necessary to support each of 
their major activities and, thus, to determine the overall leverage for the bank as a 
whole. However, as discussed above, there are still unresolved issues that need to be 
addressed in order to fully implement risk-adjusted techniques for consolidated risk-
management models.
24 First, there is the problem of numerous definitions of return 
                                                                                                                                                       
Review of Pro-cyclicality, Research Task Force.  See www.bis.org for more details. 
24 In January 2005, the Committee on the Global Financial System (CGFS) concluded that 
while improvements have been made in using stress testing as a practical risk management 
tool, a number of challenges still remain. Stress testing is used to see how banks would cope 
under adverse financial situations, such as the 1997 Asian financial crisis, and the failure of 
the financial house Long Term Capital Management in 1998, and what measures may be 
necessary to minimize the adversity. One area of difficulty pointed out by the CGFS was the 
need to incorporate loan portfolios, owing partly to the difficulty in marking to market loan 
portfolios and insufficient data accumulation. “Efforts to develop firm-wide credit stress tests 
for both trading and loan books have also been hindered by differences in accounting 
treatment, regulatory environments, a lack of trading markets for certain products, and/or the 
organizational structure of firms,” the CGFS said. Another problem is that “although firms 
recognize the potential for feedback effects--which measure the second-round impact of firms' 
own activities on prices--these effects are rarely incorporated in stress tests because they are 
difficult to measure." (The CGFS report, "Stress Testing at Major Financial Institutions: 
 
 
28(profit, contribution, revenue, etc.) and capital (regulatory capital, risk capital, etc.) 
that needs to be resolved in order to correctly assess the risk-adjusted performance 
measures. Second, difficulties arise out of the need to align and compare risk and 
returns across various business lines. In particular, to cover all possible combinations 
of subsidiary investments, this implies the need for a framework that would include 
credit, market, technical, and operational risks. Finally, risk-based models require the 
use of the bank’s actual default history and more sophisticated statistical techniques.  
Therefore, it is more likely that large, more diversified, internationally active banks 
will opt for the most advanced internal ratings-based approach under the proposed 
BIS capital accord, which more closely links capital charges to the risk exposures.  
 
6.  Conclusions 
Current capital regulation sets the minimum capital requirements uniformly 
across banks, regardless of diversification benefits achieved from combining less 
than perfectly correlated business activities. This study investigated the issue of risk-
adjusted performance models, which allow financial institutions to build internal 
portfolio-based measures of risk. Researchers have argued that this approach should 
lead to capital charges that more accurately reflect individual banks’ true risk 
exposures (Hendricks and Hirtle, 1997). These concerns are relevant in light of the 
current review of bank capital requirements. The new Basel rules will recognize 
correlations between risk factors and will make use of VaR models that yield a much 
more accurate assessment of the likely loss in value and necessary levels of capital 
buffer.  
                                                                                                                                                       
Survey Results and Practice," is available on the Bank for International Settlements’ web site 
 
 
29Empirical evidence on risk-adjusted performance presented in this paper is 
based on the sample of domestic BHCs that combined traditional commercial 
banking with investment banking activities from 1990 through 1999. Results indicate 
that risk-adjusted performance measures for these entities: 1) are different from the 
traditional performance metrics, such as ROE, particularly when the correlations 
between banks’ activities are nonzero; 2) they are consistent with optimal allocation 
of capital derived from the optimal portfolio theory, especially in business units in 
which economies are not exhausted; and 3) the derived composition of the optimal 
portfolios shows that BHCs can take advantage of potential gains from diversification 
by allocating their resources to nontraditional banking activities, such as securities 
underwriting. In view of recent bank deregulation and growing consolidation in the 
banking industry, the results of this study are of particular relevance to bank 
management and regulators.  
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This table describes the relationship between active performance measures for banks: the 
standard  Sharpe ratio, SR (RVAR=reward to variability), Treynor ratio, TR (RVOL=reward 
to volatility), and Jensen’s measure, α  (EVA=Economic Value Added).  Ri and si are the 
average rate of return and the standard deviation of return on the activity i, respectively; Rm is 
the return on the reference market portfolio (the reference portfolio has the standard deviation 
of sm); Rf is the risk-free rate of return (such as the Treasury bill rate); rim is the correlation 








==  is the internal beta.  The 
decision rule: superior performance requires a positive
i α in all three measures. The ratio of  i α  
to  i σ  shows how much a portfolio outperforms the benchmark market portfolio. The ratio of 
i α to bi for portfolio i gives an improvement in the Treynor’s measure relative to the passive 
market portfolio.   
Source: similar table appears in Bodie, Kane, and Marcus (2005). 
 
 






























     
1  2  5.315 0.302 5.485 
2  7  2.289 0.305 4.188 
3  1  2.383 1.708 3.432 
4  15  2.591 1.086 3.319 
5  10  1.950 0.170 2.870 
6 4  3.454  -0.430  2.799 
7 16  2.438  -0.118  2.215 
8  6  1.455 0.935 1.984 
9  5  1.270 0.522 1.651 
10 14  2.184  -1.176  1.614 
11  8  1.235 0.715 1.501 
12  12  0.813 0.949 1.213 
13  9  0.591 0.067 0.999 
14 20  1.898  -1.146  0.966 
15  13  1.053 0.462 0.966 
16  19  0.633 0.417 0.912 
17  3  0.720 0.829 0.867 
18  18  0.165 0.279 0.860 
19  17  0.789 0.577 0.785 
20 11  0.487  -0.006  0.748 
Average 1.68  0.32  1.97 
 









where NIi is the average earnings from activity i;  i σ =standard deviation of earnings in i; NIfi 
is average earnings in the risk-free activity attributed to activity i and is equal to Rf*Eit, where 
Rf is the risk-free return on a Treasury bill and Eit the average equity investment in activity i.  
The rank correlation between column 1 and column 2 is 0.5 and equals zero at the 1% 
significance level. The rank correlation between column 3 (RVAR of banking units) and 
column 5 (RVAR of BHCs) is 0.9 and significant, while the correlation between column 4 
(RVAR of Section 20) and column 5 (RVAR of BHCs) is 0.1 and insignificant. Several 
outliers were deleted from the sample because of either large deviation from the mean or a 
























    
1 2  -15.958  0.303 
2 7  2.982  0.386 
3 1  2.522  2.855 
4 15  3.236  1.279 
5 10  2.347  0.430 
6 4  3.530  1.066 
7 16  2.438  -0.148 
8 6  1.548  1.297 
9 5  1.347  0.683 
10 14  2.507  1.783 
11 8  1.299  1.077 
12 12  0.839  1.373 
13 9  0.618  0.106 
14 20  1.995  50.628 
15 13  1.340  0.579 
16 19  0.643  1.930 
17 3  2.275  1.233 
18 18  0.220  0.683 
19 17  0.792  0.882 
20 11  0.497  -0.019 
Average 0.851  0.936* 
 
The first two columns present rankings based on the reward to variability (RVAR) and the 
traditional ROE measures.  














where NIi is the average earnings from activity i;  i σ =standard deviation of earnings in i; NIfi 
is average earnings in the risk-free activity attributed to activity i and is equal to Rf*Eit, where 
Rf is the risk-free return on a Treasury bill and Eit the average equity investment in activity i. 
Several outliers were deleted from the sample because of either large deviation from the mean 
or a small number of observations.  
 
 























     
1 2  0.158  0.016 
2 7  -0.027  0.022 
3 1  -0.054  0.159 
4 15  0.030  0.122 
5 10  0.004  0.021 
6 4  0.110  -0.081 
7 16  0.051  -0.002 
8 6  -0.003  0.224 
9 5  0.110  0.149 
10 14  0.034  -0.081 
11 8  0.002  0.074 
12 12  -0.005  0.149 
13 9  -0.019  0.003 
14 20  0.105  -0.059 
15 13  0.059  0.201 
16 19  -0.007  0.050 
17 3  0.055  0.076 
18 18  -0.004  0.076 
19 17  0.024  0.077 
20 11  0.018  -0.002 
Average 0.032  0.06 
 
The first two columns present rankings based on the reward to variability (RVAR) and the 
traditional ROE measures.  
)] ( [ fi p ip fi i i i NI NI NI NI A EVA − + − = ≡ β  
where NIi is the average earnings from activity i;  i σ =standard deviation of earnings in i; NIfi 
is average earnings in the risk-free activity attributed to activity i and is equal to Rf*Eit, where 
Rf is the risk-free return on a Treasury bill and Eit the average equity investment in activity i; 
NIp is the average earnings of the BHC (benchmark) portfolio.  Superior performance over the 
benchmark requires a positive value of Jensens’s alpha or the EVA measure.  
Several outliers were deleted from the sample because of either large deviation from the mean 




37Table 5  Optimal and Existing Composition of the BHC Portfolios, Short Term 
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This table compares the estimated optimal and actual portfolio composition of BHCs that 
operated commercial banking units (CB) and Section 20 affiliates (Sec 20) from 1990 through 
1999 and reports changes in the portfolio mix needed to achieve the optimal allocation for the 
short-term horizon. The optimal allocation of BHCs’ activities is determined by deriving 
efficient frontiers and solving for optimal portfolios for each BHC separately and for the 
group as a whole. In the short run, the possibilities of change in banks’ positions are limited to 
20% from the original portfolio composition. The table also reports actual changes in the 
portfolio composition between the two sub-periods: 1990-1994 and 1995-1999.  The rankings 
are based on the Sharpe ratio (RVAR=the reward to variability). Calculations were performed 
for BHCs that reported continuously during the sample period and whose “other” activities 
(those besides commercial banking and investment banking) constituted less than 50% of 
consolidated BHCs’ assets (12 BHCs).  
 
 
38Table 6  Optimal and Existing Composition of the BHC Portfolios, Long Term 










 CB  Sec  20 
 
Other  CB  Sec 20  Other  CB  Sec 20 
4 65.3  15.4  19.3  74.9  2.0  23.1  -9.6  13.4 
5 67.6  0.0  32.4  75.0  25.0  0.0  -7.4  -25.0 
8 92.3  0.0  7.8  79.0  0.1  20.0  13.3  -0.1 
11 64.8  32.6  2.6  78.6  0.8  20.6  -31.0  31.8 
12 33.2  44.0  22.8  82.0  0.2  17.8  -48.8  43.9 
13 52.5  47.9  0.0  84.5  5.0  10.0  -32.4  42.9 
15 38.1  36.0  25.9  62.9  1.5  35.0  -24.8  34.5 
16 56.9  21.4  21.6  80.0  3.0  16.0  -23.1  18.4 
17 48.3  46.9  4.8  71.8  0.8  27.0  -23.5  46.1 
18 60.0  9.7  30.4  60.0  1.0  39.0  0.0  8.7 
19 80.8  15.1  4.1  71.9  7.1  21.0  8.9  8.0 
20 64  0.0  36.0  64.1  6.7  29.2  0.0  -6.7 
Average  60.9 22.4 16.7  73.7  4.4 22.4  -12.8 18.0 
 
This table compares the estimated optimal and actual portfolio composition of BHCs that 
operated commercial banking units (CB) and Section 20 affiliates (Sec 20) from 1990 through 
1999 and reports changes in the portfolio mix needed to achieve the optimal allocation for 
both long-term and short-term horizons. The optimal allocation of BHCs’ activities is 
determined by deriving efficient frontiers and solving for optimal portfolios for each BHC 
separately and for the group as a whole. In the short run, the possibilities of change in banks’ 
positions are limited to 20% from the original portfolio composition. In the long run, 
unlimited changes in the composition of a bank portfolio are allowed.  The long-term changes 
are reported in parenthesis.  The table also reports actual changes in the portfolio composition 
between the two sub-periods: 1990-1994 and 1995-1999.  The rankings are based on the 
Sharpe ratio (RVAR=the reward to variability). Calculations were performed for BHCs that 
reported continuously during the sample period and whose “other” activities constituted less 
than 50% of consolidated BHCs’ assets (12 BHCs). The discrepancy between short-term (in 
Table 5) and long-term optimal allocations may exist because of the possible slow and costly 
adjustment in the banks’ portfolio allocation (see text). 
 
 
39Table 7  Economic, Available, and Regulatory Capital 
Average 
Variable   ($, mil.) 
Standard Deviation 
($, mil.) 
Economic Capital of Commercial Banking Units   $249.8  $1713.5 
Economic Capital of Section 20 Subs  36.9  51.1 
Economic Capital of BHCs  3,300.8  2,362.9 
Total Equity Capital of Banking Units  4,663.9  3,946.9 
Total Equity Capital of Section 20 Subs  157.4  190.2 
Total Equity Capital of BHCs  7,250.9  5,585.8 
Regulatory Capital of BHCs  10,148  8,079.8 
RBC Ratio of BHCs  12%   
Leverage Capital Ratio of Banking Units  7.8% 
 (vs.  Economic Capital Ratio of Banking Units)  (1.7%)   
Leverage Capital Ratio of Section 20 Subs 
(Economic Capital Ratio of Section 20 Subs) 
19.2% 
(2.2%)   
Leverage Capital Ratio of BHCs  (Economic 




(3.5%)   
Risk-Adjusted Return on Commercial Banking  2.16%   
Risk-Adjusted Return on Section 20  3.19%   
Risk-Adjusted Return on BHCs  4.41%   
This table uses the same sample as Table 2. The table compares leverage (actual) capital 
ratios – defined as the ratio of total equity capital over the entity’s total assets – to economic 
capital ratios (defined as the ratio of economic capital to entity’s total assets). Risk-adjusted 
return is derived by dividing adjusted income by the total amount of economic capital. 
Economic capital, or earnings at risk (EAR), is defined as  * α σ , whereα is a constant 
(here,α =3), and σ is the standard deviation of earnings for an activity between 1990 and 
1999.  Total equity capital of banks, securities affiliates, and BHCs come from Call Reports, 
FR Y-20, and BHC reports.   
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